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This  paper  provides  a  unified  treatment  of  externalities  associated  with  fertility  and  human  capital 
accumulation within pas-as-you-go pension systems. It considers an overlapping generations model in which 
every generation consists of high earners and low earners with the proportion of types being determined 
endogenously. The number of children is deterministically chosen but the children’s future ability is in part 
stochastic, in part determined by the family background, and in part through education. In addition to the 
customary externality source associated with a change in average fertility rate, this setup highlights another 
externality source. This is due to the effect of a parent’s choice of number and educational attainment of his 
children  on  the  proportion  of  high-  ability  individuals  in  the  steady  state.  Our  other  results  include:  (i) 
Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must be subsidized; (ii) direct child subsidies to one 
or both parent types can be negative; i.e., they can be taxes; (iii) net subsidies to children (direct child 
subsidies plus education subsidies) to at least one type of parents must be positive; (iv) parents who have a 
higher number of children should invest less in their education. 
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One of the most pressing problems facing the economies of the industrialized world is
the ﬁscal solvency of their pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security systems.1 An im-
portant contributing factor to this problem has been the recent drastic fertility declines
in Western Europe and Japan. What truly determines fertility, and what accounts for
the observed evolution in fertility behavior, are still open questions. What is clear,
however, is that, faced with a PAYGO social security system, parents do not have the
right incentives to choose a fertility rate that is optimal. In such systems, each person’s
fertility decision aﬀects the economy’s population growth rate and with it everybody’s
pension beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, an increase in the rate of population growth increases the
number of future workers who will have to support a retired person. No individual,
however, takes this impact into account and that leads to a decentralized equilibrium
outcome with too few children.2
The above problem is exacerbated by another externality associated with the “qual-
ity” of children, and their human capital accumulation, through the education decisions
of parents. The rate of return of a pay-as-you-go system depends not just on the fertility
rate, but also on productivity growth. The more productive the children, the higher
will be their ability to produce and to pay taxes. This reinforces the public good nature
of a family’s child-rearing activities.3
Most of the literature has thus far treated the quality and quantity issues separately;
or else have lumped the investments in quantity and quality together as if one decision
1This has led to reforms in a number of countries. See Penner (2007) who surveys the recent reforms
i nC a n a d a ,G e r m a n y ,I t a l y ,J a p a n ,S w e d e n ,a n dt h eU K .
2In addition to this “intergenerational transfer” eﬀect, the literature has also noted an oﬀsetting
force called “capital dilution” eﬀect: A higher fertility rate, given the aggregate capital saved by the
previous generation, implies a lower capital to labor ratio reducing per capita output; see Michel and
Pestieau (1993) and Cigno (1993).
3To internalize the quantity and quality eﬀects, some economists have advocated a policy of linking
pension beneﬁts (or contributions) to individuals’ fertility choices. See, among others, Abio et al.
(2004), Bental (1989), Cigno et al. (2003), Fenge and Meier (2004), Kolmar (1997), van Groezen et al.
(2000, 2003).
1determines both.4 A basic shortcoming of this approach is that it cannot distinguish
between child subsidies, which correct externalities emanating from fertility decisions,
and education subsidies which correct for externalities due to investing in education.
This lack of distinction becomes more of a serious problem when the two types of
externalities interact as they often do.
To be sure, there are a number of studies in the literature that distinguish between
quantity and quality decisions and study them both in one uniﬁed framework. Peters
(1995) is an early example of this. In his model, both fertility and education choices are
made deterministically. The main shortcomings of his approach are the deterministic
nature of both quantity and quality decisions, and the lack of any heterogeneity among
parents. Cigno et al. (2003) also allow for both fertility and quality. Fertility is fully
deterministic, but children’s quality, which Cigno et al. deﬁne in terms of “lifetime tax
contributions”, is in part random and in part determined through actions of parents.
The limitations of their study come from the static nature of their model, in looking at
the decisions of the initial parent only, and their not allowing for heterogeneity among
parents.
Cigno and Luporini (2003), while building on Cigno et al. (2003), allow for parents’
heterogeneity in terms of their ability to inﬂuence their children’s probability of success
in life.5 However, their model remains static in nature as they too do not go beyond
the decisions of the initial parents. In Meier and Wrede (2008) both fertility and types
are partly stochastic and partly determined by investments. The limitation of their
model comes from their ignoring the impact of fertility and education investments on
the distribution of types in the economy. But this induced change in the distribution of
types constitutes an important component of fertility and education externalities.6
4Cremer et al. (2003, 2008) are examples of this latter approach, while Cremer et al. (2006) is
concerned only with quantity decisions.
5They also drop Cigno et al.’s (2003) assumption that fertility is fully deterministic.
6Sinn (2004) also considers a model that allows or both fertility and quality. In his setup fertility
is fully random and quality fully deterministic. However, Sinn is interested more in examining the
2The current paper addresses the quantity and quality questions in an overlapping
generations model with high- and low-ability individuals. The unique feature of our
study is its endogenous determination of the distribution of types. Speciﬁcally, we allow
for this distribution to be aﬀected by both education and fertility decisions. This frame-
work gives rise to three sources of externality. First, there is the customary externality
associated with the change in average fertility–the intergenerational transfer eﬀect. It
arises from the fertility decisions of parents. This source of externality disappears if the
pension system is a pre-funded one. The second source of externality emanates from
decisions that change the distribution of types even if average fertility is kept constant.
It arises from both education decisions and fertility decisions. Its unique feature is that
it does not depend on the institution of social security and exists for pre-funded systems
as well. The third source of externality is due to interaction between average fertility
and the distribution of types. It too arises from both education decisions and fertility
decisions. It is diﬀerent from the second externality source in that it exists because of
the PAYGO institution and disappears if one moves to a pre-funded system. It is also
diﬀerent from the ﬁrst externality source because it will not exist if the distribution of
types were immutable.
One distinguishing element between quantity and quality decisions is that of timing.
One decides on the number of children quite early; the quality of children, i.e. their future
earning capacity, is determined much later. We incorporate this timing sequence in our
two-period overlapping generations model by assuming a sequential decision making
process: At the end of the ﬁrst-period, the young decide on starting a family and
having children ﬁrst and then on the extent of their children’s education.
We assume that parents choose the number of their children deterministically. It is
true that the actual number of children in a family does not necessarily coincide with
the number that parents initially intended to have.7 However, this choice is intrinsically
properties of a traditional PAYGO system rather than the properties of an optimal pension plan.
7Infertility, premature death, misplanning and multiple births are some of the reasons explaining
3more deterministic and less susceptible to random and other shocks than determining
the quality of one’s children. As to the quality, it is unrealistic to expect that one can
determine the future earning abilities of one’s children in a deterministic fashion simply
by investing in their education and training. We assume that quality is determined
by three factors. One is random; the second is due to education; and the third is
pre-determined by one’s “genes” and family background. Nevertheless all children of a
particular parent turn out to be either of high- or of low-ability.
Finally, we study the properties of an optimal pension system assuming that in-
tergenerational transfer of resources occur only through the PAYGO scheme. This
simpliﬁes the analysis drastically by allowing us to ignore the issues relating to the
choice between PAYGO and fully- or partially-funded pension systems. The determi-
nants of this choice are multi-dimensional and, given our focus on endogenous fertility
and education, any attempt to address this choice is bound to be inadequate.8
2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider, within an overlapping generations framework, the sequence of decisions a
child has to face after he is born. First, upon reaching adulthood, he has to decide on
starting a family and having children. Subsequently, as a parent, he has to decide on
the extent of his children’s education. Finally, the retirement period arrives. Such a rich
model allows for children, adults, parents, and the retired (grand parents) to overlap,
requiring a four-period overlapping generations model. However, analyzing a full-ﬂedged
four period model quickly becomes cumbersome and too detailed for developing insights.
this gap.
8One important question here is whether or not one should have a PAYGO system if the rate of
return to capital exceeds the population growth rate. In a stripped down model such as ours, a PAYGO
pension plan is undesirable unless the economy is characterized by dynamic ineﬃciency. Although Weil
(2008) has recently argued that this possibility may arise even in advanced countries, we do not want
to cope with this issue.
4We thus take a short cut and transform the four-period setup we have in mind into a
simple two-period overlapping generations model. To do this we assume the decisions
of having children and educating them occur sequentially just prior to the beginning of
one’s retirement. This saves us from having to distinguish between working as an adult
and working as a parent.
Assume each generation consists of two types of people; they posses either a high
or a low earning ability. Denote high- and low-ability types by subscripts  and  and
let  = . All children of a particular parent will turn out to be either of high- or of
low-ability; no mix of high- and low-ability children is possible. There are three factors
that determine if a child turns into a high- or a low-ability individual. One is due
education; the second is a random element; and the third is pre-determined by one’s
“genes” and family background. The eﬀect of education on ability is, ceteris paribus,
most certainly positive. To introduce randomness into this process, we assume that
investing in education does not necessarily transform a child into a high-ability type;
instead, it only increases the probability of its occurrence. Thus, when a -type parent
invests  “units” in educating his child, the child will have a  = () probability of
turning out to be of high-ability. Naturally, the probability that the child will be of
low-ability is 1− We assume that (·) is an increasing and strictly concave function
with  (0)  0
The third factor, the child’s family background, manifests itself through the func-
tional form of () and that is why the function is indexed by . Speciﬁcally, one would
expect that ()  () That is, for the same level of (formal) education, children of
high-ability parents have a higher chance of becoming more able. This reﬂects the fact
that high-ability parents tend to spend more time reading to their children and engage
them in activities that builds up their human capital. To say more about the structure
of () one needs to know the precise nature of the interaction between (formal) ed-
ucation and family background on a child’s ability. Decompose () into two distinct
5elements: an educational component () and a family background component repre-
sented by a parameter ,w i t h   We assume that the interaction between ()
and  is additive so that  = ()+9 According to this formulation, the marginal
productivity of spending  dollars on educating one’s children is the same regardless of
the parent’s type.10
Assume generation  consists of  people. Denote the proportion of high-ability
persons in generation  by  (0    1) so that the number of high-ability persons
in generation  is . Parents choose the number of the children they want to have
and do so deterministically. Denote the number of children each -type parent will
have by  Thus  high-ability parents of generation  e n du pw i t h()
high-ability children and () (1 − ) low-ability children. Similarly, (1 − )
low-ability persons of generation  end up with (1 − ) high-ability children
and (1 − ) (1 − ) low-ability children. Consequently, the proportion of high-
ability children in the next generation will be
+1 =
 +( 1− )
 +( 1− )
=
 +( 1− )
 +( 1− )
 (1)
2.2 Steady state
In the steady state, +1 =  ≡  It then follows from equation (1) relating +1 to
 that
 +( 1− )
 +( 1− )
=  (2)
Observe that  is a weighted average of  and  and thus bracketed by them. Moreover,
equation (2) indicates that  is homogeneous of degree zero in ( ) It follows from
9Observe that in this case    6 1 −  ()
10Alternatively, one can posit a multiplicative relationship between () and  so that  = ()
(with    6 1())This assumption states that the marginal productivity of spending  dollars
is higher for the more able parents. Its main import is to enhance the educational investment of high-
ability parents relative to low-ability ones. Otherwise, it has similar implications for the nature of









It follows from this equation that  and  a r eo fo p p o s i t es i g n s .
Let  denote the -type’s investment in the education of his children. Solve equation
(2) for  a n dw r i t et h es o l u t i o na s = (   ) Introduce
 ≡ 2( − )+(1 + ) −  (4)
























(1 − )( − )

 (8)
We prove in Appendix A that a necessary condition for the stability of steady-state
solution for  namely |+1|  1 is that 0. Thus, assuming a stable steady








To establish a benchmark, we start by studying the properties of laissez-faire equilib-
rium of the economy. Individuals have preferences over consumption when young, ,
consumption when retired,  and the number of children,  They also care about the
quality of their children. We represent this by assigning a higher weight to the subutility
for children if they turn out to be of high ability. Speciﬁcally, the preferences of a -type
parent for having -type children are represented by
7 = ()+()+() (9)
where    with  −  indicating the strength of preferences for higher-ability
children. Under this circumstance, given the partly stochastic nature of children ability,
each -type will have an ex-ante expected utility depending on the outcome of his
investment in children. Setting  =1  and  = 1 we have
 = ()+()+()+( 1− )()
= ()+()+[ 1+(  − 1)(()+)]() (10)
Assume each -type person earns an income equal to  when young, where  
.11 Without any loss of generality, set  =1and  = 1 Denote the non-
education cost of raising a child by  and the “quantity” of education provided to a
child by  Choose the units of measurement for  and  such that their producer
prices are one. The young individual spends a portion of his income on his immediate
consumption,  a portion on raising his children,  and another portion on educating
his children, . He saves the rest of his income receiving a rate of return equal to 
Upon retirement, the individual receives and spends all his savings plus interest, leaving
no bequests.
Denote the rate of interest by  The budget constraint for the -type is given by
 =  +

1+
+  +  (11)
The -type young individual chooses    and  to maximizes his utility (10)
subject to his budget constraint (11). This problem is summarized by the Lagrangian
L = ()+()+[ 1+(  − 1)(()+)]()
+
∙






11We assume that  does not depend on the economy’s capital stock. In this sense, our overlapping
generations model is of Samuelson’s (1958) variety rather than Diamond’s (1965).
8Manipulating the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to    and  the laissez faire

















1+(  − 1)(()+)
 (15)
 =  +

1+
+ ( + ) (16)
A tt h i sl e v e lo fg e n e r a l i t y ,t h ee ﬀect of a higher level of income on educational
investment is not clearcut. There are diﬀerent forces at work. Consequently, one cannot
determine which type invests more in education or has more children.12
The results of this section are summarized as
Proposition 1 Consider an overlapping generations model in the steady state with two
types of people in each generation: high- and low-ability. Each type receives an income
commensurate with his ability when young and has preferences over consumption during
working years and retirement, as well as the number of children he will have and their
ability type. Each type can have children of either ability. The probability of having a
high-ability child depends positively on investment in education and is higher, ceteris
paribus, for high-ability parents. Then:
(i) Investment in education by either type of parents increases the proportion of
high-ability persons in the steady state, .
12If parents care about having children but not about their ability types, the ambiguity goes away.
This is a special case of our model in which  =1  Under this circumstance, one can easily see that
the solution for education expenditures requires  =0 . This is not surprising given that education is
costly to the parent but bestows no utility upon him. Observe also that in this case, the ﬁrst-order
condition (15) will be simpliﬁed to 
0()
0()= One can then show that, given strong separability
and concavity of all subutility functions,  and  are all normal goods so that       and
  
9(ii) Increasing the number of children increases  for one type of parents and de-
creases it for the other.
(iii) The laissez-faire solution is found from equations (13)—(16).
3 Utilitarian First Best
Denote the population growth rate by
 ≡  +( 1− ) (17)
The economy’s resource constraint in the steady state is then written as
[1 + ( − 1))] = 
∙











Thus the consumption of the retired is ﬁnanced from taxes imposed on the young
as in a pay-as-you-go retirement system. In what follows, we simplify our analysis
by concentrating on the steady-state equilibrium, ignoring the welfare of generations
who live on the transitional path from one steady state to another. This approach is
equivalent to assuming that the government’s social welfare function is deﬁned over
unweighted average utilities of all current and future generations. Clearly, the extent
of redistribution across generations are susceptible to this particular choice of social
welfare function.
3.1 The problem and its solution
Using the economy’s resource constraint (18), the government’s optimization problem
is summarized by the Lagrangian
£ =  {()+()+[ 1+(  − 1)(()+)]()} +
(1 − ){()+()+[ 1+(  − 1)()+]()} +

n
[1 +  − 1)] − 
∙











10leading to the following ﬁrst-order conditions with respect    and :
£

= [0() − ]=0  (20)
£














Manipulating these conditions yields
 =  =  and  =  = 





=[ 1+(  − 1)(()+)]() − [1 + ( − 1)()+]()
+0()
½





Observe that  shows the change in social welfare due to an increase in the proportion
of high-ability persons in the population so that it must be positive.13 With  =  and
 =  the ﬁrst bracketed term on the right-hand side of (24) shows the net change in
utilities. The second bracketed expression shows the net change in resources; i.e. the
increase in the available resources minus the extra resources required in consumption.14
Using the deﬁnition of  and the previous ﬁndings that  =  =   =  =  and
 = 0() one can write the ﬁrst-order conditions for the maximization of social welfare
13Being a proportion, this is matched by a reduction in the proportion of low-ability persons.
14This term arises only in conjunction with pensions. A change in  changes  =  + ( − )
the number of future working people who support a retired person under a PAYGO pension plan.













=( 1 − )
£










[1 + ( − 1)(()+)]0() −
µ












=( 1 − )
½
[1 + ( − 1)(()+)]0() −
µ










Investing in education raises the probability of one’s children to be of high ability.
To the extent that parents prefer to have high ability children, this increases their
utility as measured by ( − 1)()0() At the same time, investment in education
is costly. Spending  to educate each of one’s children imposes a utility cost of 0()
on the parent. Thus the ﬁrst expression in equations (25) and (26) show the net private
beneﬁt of investment in education. The second expressions in these equations reveal










for increasing  (30)
This externality arises through the eﬀect of  on  Moreover, given that   0
and 0 this is a positive externality.
The externality terms (29)—(30) coming through  may be divided into two parts.
One is due to the direct change in  as  changes. When there is an increase in the
proportion of high-ability persons in the population, matched of course by a reduction
in the proportion of low-ability persons, social welfare changes by the diﬀerence in
the utilities of high- and low-ability types and the change in the net resources (income
minus consumption). This eﬀect does not work through fertility; it is present also in the
absence of PAYGO pension plans when all second-period consumptions are ﬁnanced by
private savings. The second part, on the other hand, works through changing average
12fertility. Its existence depends on havingaP A Y G Op e n s i o np l a ni np l a c e . I ta r i s e s
indirectly as the change in  changes  as well. Remember that  depends on  and 
depends on  (as well as ). This change in  is also neglected in private calculations.
With  =  +( −) this eﬀect depends on the diﬀerence between  and .T h e
various terms in  represent these two direct and indirect externalities. The latter is
captured by the ( − )2 term that appears in the deﬁnition of ,a n dt h ef o r m e r
by the remaining expressions therein.
Similarly, increasing  has externalities of its own. When a -type individual in-
creases his fertility rate, he does not take the eﬀect of his decision on  into consideration.
He thus perceives the eﬀect of increasing  in his net welfare to consist of an increase in
his utility, [1 + ( − 1)]0(), minus an increase in his expenditures on  measured
by ( + )0(). Comparing this with the expressions in equations (27) and (28) reveals














for increasing  (32)
The externalities associated with  as depicted by expressions (31)—(32), consist
of two distinct elements. While the ﬁrst element has no counterpart in the externalities
associated with , the second element is identical in nature to the externality coming
from  The term 2 represents the ﬁrst element and captures the eﬀect of increasing
 or  on  and through it on the aggregate resources available for distribution
between the young and the old under PAYGO. Speciﬁcally, this externality tells us that
increasing fertility increases the number of future working people who support a retired
person. This is the familiar positive “intergenerational transfer” eﬀect that appears in
the literature on growth with endogenous fertility; see Cigno (1993) and Michel and
Pestieau (1993). The second externality source, represented by the second expressions
15The term 
2 is present only in conjunction with pensions.
13in (31)—(32), is due to the change in . It is the same type of externality discussed
previously in relation to the eﬀect of  on  T h ec r u c i a lp o i n ti st h a tt h e s ee x t e r n a l i t i e s
emanate from a change in  which can come about from a change in either  or 
This is why each of the second expressions in (31)—(32) is identical to its counterpart
in (29)—(30) except that  and  have replaced  and  Finally,
observe that with 0 this externality source is positive if   0 and is negative
if   0. Recall also that  and  are of opposite signs; hence one
ability type exerts a positive externality, and the other a negative externality, on the
society through their fertility decisions when mediated through 
The results thus far in this section are summarized as
Proposition 2 (i) Under the utilitarian ﬁrst-best solution with PAYGO, the number
of children that high- and low-ability parents have and the amounts of investment they
make in the education of their children are characterized by equations (25)—(28).
(ii) Investing in education of children by either type of parents bestows a positive
externality on everybody else. This externality has two components, one of which exists
o n l yi nt h ep r e s e n c eo fP A Y G Op e n s i o np l a n s .
(iii) A parent’s fertility choice imposes two kinds of externalities on everyone else.
One is the familiar positive externality known as “intergenerational transfer” eﬀect. The
other emanates from a change in the proportion of high-ability children. This externality
too has two components, one of which exists only in the presence of PAYGO pension
plans.
3.3 Who should have more children and invest in education?
One interesting question concerns the relative size of  to  and  to ; that is, which
type should have more children and which type should invest more in education. To
examine this question, substitute the expressions for  and  from (7)—(8)
14into equations (27)—(28) and simplify. Then subtract one equation from another to get
©
[1 + ( − 1)]0() − [1 + ( − 1)]0()
ª
− ( − )0()+


( − )=0 
(33)
To see the intuition for this result, consider a concomitant increase in  and a re-
duction in  On the one hand, this changes the utilities of the two types of parents
by [1 + ( − 1)]0() −[1 + ( − 1)]0() On the other hand, there will be an
increase in resource cost to the economy because educational expenditures increase by
− which is worth ( − )0() in terms of utilities. This should be subtracted from
the utility beneﬁt. Additionally, there is a gain to the economy through the externalities
that emanate from a change in  This is measured by the last expression in (33). The
above relationship tells us that at the optimum the sum of all the marginal eﬀects must
be zero. However, (33) does not allow us to determine which type should have more
children. The source of this ambiguity is in the fact that fertility rates and educational
investment levels move in opposite direction. We elaborate on this point below.
Divide equation (25) by (26) and substitute the expressions for  and 





=(  − 1)0()0()[() − ()] (34)
It follows from the concavity of (·) that the left-hand side of (34) has the same sign
as ( − ) Similarly, concavity of (·) implies that the right-hand side of (34) has
the same sign as ( − ) Consequently, at the ﬁrst-best, ( − ) and ( − )
are of opposite signs. That is, those parents who have a higher number of children
should invest less in their education.That these two decisions go in opposite directions
cause an ambiguity in determining which type of parents should have more children
and which type should invest more in education. This ambiguity disappears in the
special case when parents care only for the number of children they have but not their
type. Under this circumstance, the decisions on fertility and education do not run in
15opposite directions. One can then show that under the utilitarian ﬁrst-best solution with
PAYGO: (i) Both types of parents invest equally in education; (ii) High-ability parents
have more children; (iii) Increasing the fertility rate of high-ability parents increases the
proportion of high-ability children in the economy and bestows a positive externality
on everybody else; (iv) Increasing the fertility rate of low-ability parents, reduces the
proportion of high-ability children and imposes a negative externality on everybody else.
See Cremer et al. (2010).
3.4 Decentralization
As observed earlier, we assume that second-period consumption levels are ﬁnanced
through the PAYGO pension system. This requires the government to impose a one-
hundred percent tax on savings and their returns. Recall also that the optimum requires
equal consumption levels for the two ability types both during working years and re-
tirement. Consequently, the government must provide everyone with the same pension
 =  =  =  where  is evaluated at its ﬁrst-best value. Next, to induce the
correct choice of fertility and education, two types of subsidies are required. One is a
subsidy on education at the rate  for the -type, the other is a direct child subsidy
to the -type equal to  dollars per child. Finally, ﬁrst-period lump-sum taxes,  are
required to ensure that consumption levels during working years are the same for both
types. Below, we show how these instruments decentralize the ﬁrst-best allocations.
Give these instruments, pensions are ﬁxed and parents decide only on their ﬁrst-
period consumption, fertility, and children’s education. Let  denote the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with the budget constraint of a -type parent. The optimization
problem of this parent is summarized by the Lagrangian expression,
L = ()+[ 1+(  − 1)(()+)]()
+
£
 −  − ( − ) − (1 − ) − 
¤

16The ﬁrst-order conditions are
L

= 0() −  =0  (35)
L

=(  − 1)()0() − (1 − ) =0  (36)
L

=[ 1 + (  − 1)(()+)]0() −  [ −  +( 1− )]=0  (37)
The question one needs to examine is how to set the tax rates such that the solution
to the individual’s ﬁrst-order conditions (35)—(37) above coincide with the ﬁrst-best
solution ( ) from equations (20)—(28).
First, compare equation (36), using (35), with (25) and (26). This tells us that

















where  i ss e ta ti t sﬁrst-best value. To understand the intuition behind equations (38)—
(39), note that the algebraic expressions in these equations are precisely the externality
t e r m st h a tc o m ei n t op l a yt h r o u g h as  and  change. The equations then tell us that
at the optimum the subsidy rates on educationm u s te q u a t et h e i rm a r g i n a le x t e r n a l i t y
beneﬁts. Observe also that with   0   0 and 0 (38)—(39) tell us
that   0 and   0 These results make sense and are due to the positive eﬀect of
investment in education on the proportion of high-ability persons in the economy.
Second, compare equation (37), using (35), with (27) and (28). We will have




















The left-hand sides of (40) and (41),  + and  + show the net subsidy given
to an -type and to an -type parent for each of his children. The right-hand sides of
17(40) and (41) consist of the two externality sources described previously; they both are
present when  and  change. These equations thus tell us that, at the optimum, we
should subsidize the cost of having a child by an amount equal to its net externality
beneﬁt.
Recall that the cost of raising and educating a child is  +  A child subsidy of 
dollars per child reduces this cost. Similarly, a subsidy to education reduces this cost
but through lowering the price of one particular element of it, namely, education cost.
Thus a subsidy to education is also a subsidy to children. The diﬀerence is that the
education subsidy lowers the share of education cost in total cost. On the other hand,
a subsidy to children is “neutral” between the two sources of costs.
With either  or  being positive, equations (40)—(41) tell us that at
least one of the two expressions  + or  + must be positive. That is, at least
one of the two -o r-type parents receive a net subsidy for each of their children. The
other parent type, on the other hand, may receive either a net subsidy or a net tax
depending on the relative size of the two expressions on the right-hand side of (40) and
(41).
Finally, substituting ﬁrst-best values for  and  from equations (38)—(39) into



































where  and  are set at their ﬁrst-best values. These equations do not allow us
to determine the signs of  and  Indeed, either one or both can be positive (i.e. a
subsidy) as well as negative (i.e. at a x ) .
Finally, to ensure that the two types will have identical consumption levels during
working years, one has to set ﬁrst-period lump-sum taxes such that both individual
types spend the same amount of money on  It follows from the -type parent’s budget
18constraint that  must be set equal to
 =  − ( − ) − (1 − ) −  (44)
where  and  are given according to equations (40)—(43) and   and  are set at
their ﬁrst-best values.
The following proposition summarizes our results on decentralization.
Proposition 3 (i) In the ﬁrst-best, the parent type who has more children should invest
less in education.
(ii) Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must be subsidized at a
rate equal to the externalities they bestow to everyone as given by expressions (38)—(39).
(iii) Let  denote the direct child subsidy to a -type parent in dollars. Its value
must be set according to (42)—(43). Both  and  can be subsidies as well as taxes.
(iv) Direct child subsidies and education subsidies both reduce the cost of raising
children. Thus a subsidy to education is also a subsidy to fertility. The diﬀerence is
that the education subsidy lowers the share of education cost in the fertility subsidy. On
the other hand, a subsidy to children is “neutral” between the two sources of costs.
(v) Denote the subsidy rate on education investment for the -type by  Net subsi-
dies to children are then equal to +. They must be set equal to the net externalities
associated with increasing  as shown by expressions (40) and (41). At least one of
the two expressions  +  or  +  must be positive. That is, at least one of the
two -o r-type parents receive a net subsidy for each of their children; the other parent
type may receive either a net subsidy or a net tax.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In discussing PAYGO pension plans, models with endogenous fertility have emphasized
the positive externality that each person’s fertility decision bestows on everybody by
increasing everybody’s pension beneﬁts through a higher population growth rate. This
19type of externality, it has been argued, may be internalized through child subsidies. Sim-
ilarly, models with endogenous human capital formation have emphasized the positive
externality of investing in education of one’s children (because parents cannot expro-
priate the children’s extra earnings due to parents’ education expenditures). The same
argument has been put forward in cases when parents build their own human capital
which they subsequently pass on to their children. These types of externalities may be
internalized through education subsidies.
In this paper, we have combined the diﬀerent externality sources to learn what
their interactions teach us about the combination of child and education subsidies one
must use to internalize them both. We have also been concerned with the question of
heterogeneity of parents and how this may come into play in connection with externality-
correcting policies. This is particularly relevant when child and education subsidies
change the distribution of parent types. To this end, the paper has modeled endogenous
f e r t i l i t ya n dh u m a nc a p i t a lf o r m a t i o ni na no verlapping-generations framework wherein
every generation consists of high earners and low earners with the proportion of types
being determined endogenously. We have found, among other results, that:
(1) Investing in education of children by either type of parents increases the pro-
portion of high-ability children in the economy and bestows a positive externality on
everybody else. This externality has two components, one of which is speciﬁct oP A Y G O
pension plans.
(2) Increasing the fertility rate of one type of parents increase the proportion of high-
ability children in the economy and bestows a positive externality on everybody else.
An increase in the fertility rate of the other type reduces the proportion of high-ability
children and imposes a negative externality on everybody else.
(3) The ambiguity in determining which parents impose a positive externality, and
which ones a negative externality, by having more children is due to the fact that the
type who has more children invests less in education.
20(4) Direct child subsidies and education subsidies both reduce the cost of raising
children. Thus a subsidy to education is also a subsidy to fertility. The diﬀerence is
that the education subsidy lowers the share of education cost in the fertility subsidy.
On the other hand, a subsidy to children is “neutral” between the two sources of costs.
(5) Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must always be subsi-
dized because they entail positive externalities.
(6) Direct child subsidies to one or both parent types can be negative; i.e., they can
be taxes.
(7) Net subsidies to children of a particular parent type (direct child subsidies plus
education subsidies) must be set equal to the net externalities associated with increasing
the fertility rate of that type. Net child subsidies to at least one type of parents must
be positive; net child subsidies to the other type can be positive or negative.
As a ﬁnal observation, we remind our readers that our study has been conducted
in a ﬁrst-best environment. Although the main thrust of our observations should carry
over to second-best environments wherein educational investments and/or types are
not publicly observable, other interesting issues would also surface. We have left the
examination of these other issues to a subsequent paper.
21Appendix A
Proof of 2( − )+(1 + ) −   0: Rewrite equation(1) as
+1 =
 +( 1− )
 +( 1− )
≡  (  ) (A1)
The steady-state value of  is found from
½
+1 =  (  )
+1 =  = 














































Comparing the expressions for  as given by equation (A5) above and equation
(7) derived in the text tells us that the denominator in equations (7)—(8) is equal to the
denominator of (A5). That is,
 ≡ 2( − )+(1 + ) −  = [1 − ]
Now if   0 then 1−  0 ⇒ 0 On the other hand, if   0
the stability condition |+1| = ||  1 implies that 1 −   0 and
we again have 0
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